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Abstract 
Node misbehavior due to selfish or malicious behavior could 
significantly degrade the performance of MANET because most 
existing routing protocols in MANET aim to find the most 
efficient path. Overhearing and reputation based cooperation 
schemes have been used to detect and isolate the misbehaving 
nodes as well as to force them to cooperate. Performance analysis 
has been done for the network traffic using OCEAN over DSR 
on ns2 while considering the low energy levels for mobile nodes. 
Throughput, energy level, routing packets and normalized 
routing overhead are analyzed for OCEAN and normal DSR to 
show the impact of OCEAN on the overall network performance. 
Keywords: Mobile computing, Protocols, Wireless, DSR, 
Protocol design and analysis. 
1. Introduction 
Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a group of wireless 
mobile computers (or nodes), in which nodes cooperate by 
forwarding packets for each other to allow them to 
communicate beyond direct wireless transmission range [1]. 
Ad hoc networks require no centralized administration or 
fixed network infrastructure such as base stations or access 
points, and can be quickly and inexpensively set up as 
needed. They can be used in scenarios in which no 
infrastructure exists, or in which the existing infrastructure 
does not meet application requirements for reasons such as 
security or cost. 
 
These nodes generally have a limited transmission range 
and, so, each node seeks the assistance of its neighboring 
nodes in forwarding packets. Specially configured routing 
protocols are used in order to establish routes between 
nodes which are further than a single hop. However, 
cooperation among the nodes is not guaranteed in a real-
world network and the presence of misbehaving nodes 
could degrade the network performance significantly. 
 
MANETs are highly vulnerable to several types of attacks, 
due to their open medium, lack of centralized monitoring, 
management point, and lack of strong line of defense.  
Selfish nodes misbehave to save power or to improve their 
access to service relative to others [6]. Malicious nodes 
always attack the network's availability through common 
techniques such as flooding, black hole and denial of 
service attacks. 
 
Many contributions to prevent misbehavior have been 
submitted so far, such as payment schemes for network 
services, secure routing protocols, intrusion detection, 
economic incentives and distributed reputation systems to 
detect and isolate misbehaved nodes [2] [4]. These exiting 
approaches alleviate some of the problems, but not all. 
 
Despite that these schemes have proved effective. Second-
hand reputation systems require nodes in the network to 
exchange reputation information about other nodes [8] [9].  
As a result, exchanging second-hand reputation 
information opens up a new vulnerability, since nodes may 
falsely accuse other nodes of misbehaving. If a node 
observes another node participating incorrectly, it reports 
this observation to other nodes who then take action to 
avoid being affected by the misbehavior and perhaps even 
punish the node by refusing to forward its traffic. Making a 
decision about whether to believe an accusation requires 
authenticating and trusting the accusing node. Such trust 
maintenance could be performed offline or could be 
bootstrapped during network operations. In the former case, 
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the network requires a priori trust relationships that may 
not be practical in truly ad hoc networks. In the latter case, 
bootstrapping trust relationships in ad hoc networks 
involves significant complexity and risk and may not be 
reasonable for a very dynamic or short-lived network. 
 
In this paper, OCEAN (Observation-based Cooperation 
Enforcement in Ad hoc Network) was used in forbidding 
all kinds of indirect reputation information [1]. A node 
makes routing decisions based solely on direct 
observations of its neighboring nodes’ exchanges with it. 
This eliminates most trust management complexity, albeit 
at a cost of less information with which to make decisions 
about node behavior [3]. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes the similar research that has already been done in 
this area. The detailed protocol is explained in Section 3. 
The simulation environment is provided in section 4. The 
results and discussion is in section 5. Finally, section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Related Work 
Recently, the problem of security and cooperation 
enforcement has received considerable attention by 
researchers in the ad hoc network community. 
 
Watchdog and Pathrater was proposed by Marti, Giuli, Lai 
and Baker [10]. They observed increased throughput in 
mobile adhoc networks by complementing DSR with a 
watchdog for detection of denied packet forwarding and a 
pathrater for trust management and routing policy rating 
every path used, which enable nodes to avoid malicious 
nodes in their routes as a reaction. Their approach does not 
punish malicious nodes that do not cooperate, but rather 
relieves them of the burden of forwarding for others, 
whereas their messages are forwarded without complaint. 
This way, the malicious nodes are rewarded and reinforced 
in their behavior. 
 
CORE, a collaborative reputation mechanism proposed by 
Michiardi and Molva [12], also has a watchdog component; 
however it is complemented by a reputation mechanism 
that differentiates between subjective reputation 
(observations), indirect reputation (positive reports by 
others), and functional reputation (task-specific behavior), 
which are weighted for a combined reputation value that is 
used to make decisions about cooperation or gradual 
isolation of a node. Reputation values are obtained by 
regarding nodes as requesters and providers, and 
comparing the expected result to the actually obtained 
result of a request. Nodes only exchange positive 
reputation information. 
 
CONFIDANT by S. Buchegger and Jean-Yves Le Boudec 
[11], also detects misleading nodes by means of 
observation and more aggressively informs other nodes of 
this misbehavior through reports sent around the network. 
Each node in the network hosts a monitor for observations, 
reputation records for first-hand reports and trusted 
second-hand reports, trust records to control the trust 
assigned to the received warnings, and a path manager 
used by nodes to adapt their behavior according to 
reputation information. 
 
Researchers have also investigated means of discouraging 
selfish routing behavior in ad hoc networks through 
payment schemes [6]. These approaches either require the 
use of tamper-proof hardware modules or central bankers 
to do the accounting securely, both of which may not be 
appropriate in some truly ad hoc network scenarios. 
 
OCEAN is using the same concepts deployed in the 
Watchdog and Pathrater but it also punishes the selfish and 
misbehaving nodes in order to force them to cooperate in 
the network. 
3. Proposed Scheme 
OCEAN is a layer that resides between the network and 
MAC layers of the protocol stack, and it helps nodes make 
intelligent routing and forwarding decisions. OCEAN is 
designed on top of the Dynamic Source Routing Protocol 
(DSR), although many of its principles may also be useful 
in other ad hoc routing protocols. 
 
OCEAN divides routing misbehavior into two groups: 
misleading and selfish. If a node takes part in routes 
finding but does not forward a packet, it is therefore a 
misleading node and misleads other nodes. But if a node 
does not participate in routes finding, it is considered as a 
selfish node. In order to discover misleading routing 
behaviors, after a node forwards a packet to its neighbor, it 
saves the packet in its cache and monitors the neighboring 
node for a given period of time. It then produces a positive 
or negative event as its monitoring results in order to 
update the rating of neighboring node. If the rating is lower 
than faulty threshold, neighboring node is added to the list 
of problematic nodes and also added to RREQ as an avoid-
list. As a result all traffic will not use this problematic node. 
This node is given a specific time to return to the network 
because it is possible that this node is wrongly accused of 
misbehaving or if it is a misbehaving node, then it must 
improve in this time period. 
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OCEAN is composed of five components to discover 
malicious nodes:  
1. NeighborWatch: observes the behavior of the 
neighbors of a node. 
2. RouteRanker: holds the nodes ratings for the neighbor 
nodes. 
3. Rank-based Routing: applies the information from 
NeighborWatch in the actual selection of routes. 
4. Malicious Traffic Rejection: performs the 
straightforward rejection of traffic from nodes that are 
considered misleading. 
5. Second Chance Mechanism: intended to consider the 
nodes that were previously considered misleading to 
become useful again.  
 
Ocean attempts to mitigate selfish routing behavior in ad 
hoc networks. The general idea is to punish nodes for their 
selfish behavior by rejecting their traffic, in the hopes that 
this threat will force them to cooperate. OCEAN relies 
only on direct observations of interactions with neighbors 
to measure their performance. Every node maintains a 
chipcount value which acts as a bank balance for every 
neighbor node. Each node has its own bank to maintain the 
chipcount values. A node earns chips at every forwarding 
operation on behalf of the requester node and loses chips 
with every request. The decision to forward packets for a 
node is done based on the chipcount for the requester. In 
order to prevent any deadlocks in the network, the 
chipcount for all nodes are accumulated with a certain rate. 
 
There are two schemes for incrementing and decrementing 
chips, optimistic and pessimistic schemes. The optimistic 
scheme increments the chipcount only when neighbor node 
accepts the packet. It does not check whether the neighbor 
node in the route truly forwarded the packets or not. On the 
other hand, the pessimistic scheme increments the 
chipcount only when neighbor node is observed to forward 
the packet. 
4. Simulation Environment 
OCEAN has been deployed on network simulator (ns2) [13] 
over the DSR protocol. Every point on the following 
graphs represents an average for 5 simulation runs. Every 
simulation result is based on the same sent packets for a 
varying mobile network using the RandomWayPoint 
mobility model [5]. The energy model of the contributing 
nodes is considered in the simulation, the initial energy 
level is low to resemble the nature of sensor networks and 
different mobile nodes. These simulations model radio 
propagation using the realistic two-ray ground. The 
protocol has been analyzed with varying malicious nodes 
and with varying the faulty threshold. Also, the protocol 
has been compared to the normal DSR. The conditions for 
simulation are shown in Table 1. The measurements are 
done at different pause times to study the different mobility 
models and the effect of nodes mobility on different 
parameters of the network taking into consideration the 
energy of nodes. 
Table 1 General Simulation Conditions 
Number of Nodes 40 
Maximum Speed 20 m/sec 
Send Rate 4.0 
Packet Size 512 bytes 
Simulation Time 1000 sec 
Dimensions of Space 1500 m X 300 m 
Maximum Connections 20 
Pause Time 0, 400, 1000 sec 
Packet Timeout 1 msec 
Rating Increment +1 
Rating Decrement -2 
Table 2 Values of Ocean for Varying Malicious Nodes 
Faulty Threshold -40 
Second Chance Timeout 30 
Node Rating after second 
chance -30 
Energy Model EnergyModel 
Initial Energy 5 Joule 
Transmission Power 31.32e-3 Joule 
Receiving Power 35.28e-3 Joule 
Idle Power 712e-6 Joule 
Sleep Power 144e-9 Joule 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. Varying Malicious Nodes and Pause Time 
The first group of results is done with changing the number 
of malicious nodes using the simulation conditions in 
Table 2. Generally, it is expected to have the throughput 
decreasing with the increase in the number of malicious 
nodes. By analyzing Fig. 1, it is noticed that the static 
(Pause time = 1000 sec) networks have higher throughput 
than the highly mobile ones. Also, the results have shown 
that OCEAN succeeded to maintain the throughput of the 
network in case of 12% malicious nodes to an average of 
81% of the actual throughput and in case of 25% malicious 
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nodes to an average of 68%. This shows the strength of 
OCEAN. 
 
In Fig. 2, the routing packets are analyzed with different 
number of malicious nodes. The static networks have the 
least routing packets because the nodes do not need to 
discover new routes with every packet sent. On the other 
hand, the highly mobile networks have very high routing 
packets because the neighbors of all nodes change very 
quickly. So, a route discovery request is performed more 
frequently than the static networks. The graph also shows 
that the increase in the number of malicious nodes for all 
mobility models results in decreasing the number of 
coordinating nodes in the forwarding of packets. This 
results in using a certain number of nodes in all 
communications, which results in having almost similar 
routing packets in a network with 60% or more of 
malicious nodes. 
 
The final energy level of the network is analyzed as shown 
in Fig. 3. It is calculated as the sum of the final energy of 
the nodes divided by the total number of nodes. The graph 
shows that OCEAN succeeded to consume small amounts 
of energy to keep the lifetime of the nodes to a maximum 
level with high throughput at different pause times. Also, 
the graph shows that the higher the mobility of the network, 
the more energy is consumed. 
5.2 Varying Faulty Threshold 
The second group of results is done by changing the faulty 
threshold, second chance mechanism timeout and node 
rating after the second chance timeout. This study aims to 
find the most suitable faulty threshold for every network. 
The results have been measured with 25% and 50% 
malicious nodes at different pause times based on the 
values shown in Table 3. The throughput in this group of 
results is measured only for any route that is at least 2 hops 
to see the effect of misleading nodes on the overall 
throughput. 
 
The small faulty threshold means that the node will be 
added to the faulty list quickly, even if it is not 
intentionally malicious. In some cases, link fluctuations or 
weak signal might cause packet losses. On the other hand, 
the large faulty threshold means that all nodes will take 
enough time to use the network resources, whether it is 
cooperating or misbehaving nodes before being enlisted in 
the faulty lists of the network nodes.  
 
 
Fig.  1 Throughput of OCEAN with varying malicious nodes and 
different pause times. 
 
Fig.  2 Routing packets of OCEAN with varying malicious nodes and 
different pause times. 
 
Fig.  3 Energy Level of OCEAN with varying malicious nodes and 
different pause times. 
Since OCEAN depends only on first hand reputation (self 
reputation) for every node. So, the faulty lists are 
maintained locally per each node. It proved to have better 
throughput at low faulty threshold values. Unlike the 
second hand reputation systems which perform better at 
higher faulty thresholds. By looking to Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, it 
is noticed that the throughput was above 80% of original 
throughput at faulty thresholds less than -50 (low faulty 
threshold values).  
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Comparing these results with the second-hand reputation 
tests done by S. Bansal and M. Baker in [1], it is proved 
that OCEAN performs better than the second-hand 
reputation systems in small faulty thresholds. Because the 
second-hand reputation systems keep a central entity to 
keep the reputation of all nodes, which needs more time to 
gather accurate reputation for all nodes of the network. 
Also, increasing the faulty threshold gives more chance for 
nodes to be sure that the accused node is truly misbehaving. 
Hence, it will give more time for malicious nodes to abuse 
the network resources. In the static networks, the large 
faulty threshold proved to keep the throughput of the 
network in the good range. Thus, previous knowledge of 
the characteristics of the network will help in selecting the 
most suitable faulty threshold. 
 
By analyzing the routing packets in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, it is 
noticed that the routing packets are very high in small 
faulty thresholds (from 0 to -40). When the faulty 
threshold is small, the nodes move in and out of the faulty 
list very quickly. Also, the nodes will do a new route 
request more frequently because the nodes in the faulty list 
are updated. These route requests overload the network 
which consumes the power of the nodes updating the state 
of the network instead of forwarding packets.  
 
With the thorough analysis of the results, it is clear that 
choosing a convenient faulty threshold, second chance 
timeout, new rating for the previously accused nodes is a 
matter of compromises of the throughput and the actual 
loading of the cooperating nodes. Also, by further 
knowledge of the nature of the mobility range of the 
network, it will help choose the most suitable values for 
the network parameters.  
Table 3 Simulation Conditions for changing faulty threshold and fixed 
malicious nodes 
Faulty 
Threshold 
Second Chance 
Timeout Period 
Second 
Chance New 
Rating 
0 10 10 
-40 30 -30 
-80 80 -70 
-120 120 -110 
-160 160 -150 
-200 200 -190 
 
Fig.  4 Throughput at 25% malicious nodes for OCEAN at different 
faulty thresholds and pause times. 
 
Fig.  5 Throughput at 50% malicious nodes for OCEAN at different 
faulty thresholds and pause times. 
 
Fig.  6 Routing packets at 25% malicious nodes for OCEAN at different 
faulty thresholds and pause times. 
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Fig.  7 Routing packets at 50% malicious nodes for OCEAN at different 
faulty thresholds and pause times.  
 
Fig.  8 Throughput for OCEAN and DSR at pause time = 400 ms. 
 
Fig.  9 Routing Packets for OCEAN and DSR at pause time = 400 ms. 
5.3. Comparing OCEAN to Normal DSR 
The third group of results is done by comparing OCEAN 
to normal DSR without an intrusion detection technique. 
This group of results aims at finding the effect of adding 
the OCEAN overhead on the nodes and assessing its 
impact on the overall network performance. The 
simulation is done for the OCEAN using the values in 
Table 1 and Table 2. For the DSR, the malicious nodes are 
assumed to drop any forwarded packet but they contribute 
in the route request. The results are compared at medium 
mobility (Pause Time = 400 ms) with varying number of 
malicious nodes. 
 
In Fig. 8, the throughput is analyzed in the presence and 
absence of OCEAN. The graph shows the impact of 
OCEAN on improving the overall throughput in the 
presence of up tp 40% of the network misbehaving. Also 
the graph shows that at zero malicious nodes, the normal 
DSR has higher throughput than the OCEAN because it 
does not spend extra time processing nodes ratings. 
 
Fig. 9 shows the routing packets of the network at different 
number of malicious nodes. OCEAN proved to use more 
routing packets than normal DSR due to the fact that it 
does not take the smallest hops path like DSR; on the other 
hand, it takes the most trusted path which can be longer. 
Also, it sends packets on the trusted routes only, which 
excludes other short non-trusted routes. This way, OCEAN 
uses the good behaving nodes more frequently and ignores 
the misbehaving nodes to punish them. This overloads the 
network nodes more. 
 
Fig. 10 represents the delay graph at varying malicious 
nodes. OCEAN proved to decrease the average delay of 
packets in the presence of malicious nodes. This is 
expected because in normal DSR, the dropped packets are 
re-sent again which increase the overall delay. On the other 
hand, OCEAN uses the most efficient good behaving route 
which guarantees that the average delay is at minimum 
level. It is also noticed that at zero malicious nodes, the 
delay of normal DSR is lower than that of OCEAN 
because the extra calculations done by the nodes in 
OCEAN. 
 
In Fig. 11, the energy level of the network is analyzed for 
OCEAN and DSR. The network using the OCEAN has less 
final energy level compared to DSR. Hence, DSR 
consumes less energy than OCEAN due to the fact that it 
does not do extra processing on the packets and given that 
the malicious nodes discarded packets saved the forward 
energy needed. 
6. Conclusion 
OCEAN succeeded to maintain the throughput of the 
network to an average of 68% despite having quarter of the 
nodes of the network misbehaving. 
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Fig.  10. for OCEAN and DSR at pause time = 400 ms. 
 
Fig.  11. Energy Level for OCEAN and DSR at pause time = 400 ms. 
OCEAN also proved to consume low energy to do the 
necessary processing. This proves the strength of the 
protocol in ad hoc networks. The most important strength 
in this protocol is that it depends on first-hand reputations 
only. Since it does not need a secondary entity to keep the 
reputation of each node, which is very adequate with the 
nature of ad hoc networks. Also, the results discussed in 
section V show that the parameters of the OCEAN can be 
configured to an optimum value to achieve the highest 
throughput and save the network resources with prior 
knowledge to the properties of the network. The static 
networks work best with relatively high faulty thresholds 
while mobile networks work better at lower faulty 
thresholds.  
 
Also, OCEAN showed that it does not form a huge 
overhead on the network when compared to normal DSR. 
On the other hand, it improved the network throughput and 
average delay and sacrificed the normalized routing load 
and routing packets to ensure successful delivery of 
packets and data. OCEAN proved its relevance to the 
nature of MANETs. 
 
For the future work, OCEAN can be extended on other ad 
hoc routing protocols and analyzed. Also, further 
investigations can be done to select the most optimum 
parameters of OCEAN based on the network 
characteristics. 
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